We investigate the impact of trade liberalization upon the taxation of capital 
Introduction
It is now recognized that globalization forces may a¤ect business tax policies by inducing higher tax base elasticities. Through a panel of 21 countries between 1982 and 1999, Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2008) show that the relaxation of capital controls puts more intense competitive pressure upon corporate tax rates. From data concerning 18 OECD countries over the period 1965 -92, Rodrik (1997 …nds that taxes on capital respond negatively to trade openness. There has also been wide theoretical discussion concerning the impact of economic integration upon corporate tax policies. Most of the papers in this strand of literature predict that globalization and capital mobility would engender a race to the bottom in taxation (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986 , Wilson, 1986 , Wildasin, 1989 .
1 Nevertheless, much of this literature has assumed perfect labor markets and full employment. We therefore fail to understand how the relationship between globalization and capital tax policies depends upon labor market characteristics.
In a paper related to ours, Hungerbühler and van Ypersele (2009) Firstly, areas exhibiting intense tax interactions also often su¤er from unemployment.
It is commonly admitted that these two problems raise important policy issues in Europe.
Various examples also suggest that adjustments of the corporate tax rates may be decided with the purpose of compensating for changes in the labor market legislation. In 1998, the United Kingdom introduced a national minimum wage for the …rst time (National Minimum Wage Act 1998) and, at the same time, decided to make signi…cant corporate tax cuts. In May 2007, the US Congress approved the …rst increase in the federal minimum wage in nearly a decade (Fair Labor Standards Act 2007) 
but President Bush and Senate
Republicans have made business tax breaks a condition for supporting this minimum wage increase 3 . Such a strategy has been also adopted by some Canadian provinces after increases in the minimum wage level (e.g. British Columbia in 2001 , Ontario in 2003 .
Secondly, it is commonly admitted that trade integration a¤ects labor market outcomes. By inducing higher labor demand elasticities, trade integration may erode the bargaining power of labor vis-à-vis capital in the sharing of rents. As mentioned by Rodrik: "The reason is that employers and the …nal consumers can substitute foreign workers for domestic workers more easily -either by investing abroad or by importing the products made by foreign workers " (Rodrik, 1997, p. 16) . 4 One might then wonder whether trade integration could lessen tax competition by reducing wage claims and mitigating the need for governments to compensate …rms for labor market rigidities. We answer this question in this paper, by clarifying the impact of trade integration on business tax policies under wage rigidities.
To address our questions, we build a simple tax competition model with trade and imperfections on both labor and product markets. Our approach may be considered as an extension of economic geography literature with tax competition (Andersson and Forslid, 2003; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Gaigné and Riou, 2007; Hau ‡er and Wooton, 2010, Ottaviano and Van Ypersele, 2005) . Indeed, all these papers consider perfectly competitive labor markets and inelastic labor supply. We assume that labor market rigidities arise from a monopoly union, whereas the product market is characterized by an oligopolistic industry where …rms produce under increasing returns to scale. In addition, contrary to the conclusions o¤ered in the standard literature concerning tax competition, decisions concerning the location of capital are not simply driven by costs factors (taxes and wages) but also by other economic considerations such as increasing returns, trade costs, and market structures (Head and Mayer, 2004) . Finally, we adopt a game-theoretic approach where …rms, governments, and unions act non-cooperatively and consider di¤erent sequences of events. 3 The two chambers accepted tax breaks worth $8.3 billion over a period of 10 years. The previous increase in the US minimum wage in 1996 was also associated with 4,8 billion dollars worth of tax breaks. 4 See also the literature on international unionized oligopolies (Naylor,1998 (Naylor, , 1999 Lommerud et al., 2003) .
Our main results can be summarized as follows. We …rst show that the impact of trade integration on tax policies strongly depends upon the con…guration of the labor market.
When the labor market is competitive in both countries, the Nash capital tax rate follows a J-shaped relationship with trade costs. By contrast, when labor markets are unionized and unions act as Stackelberg leaders or play simultaneously with governments, trade integration may cause an increase in capital taxation. Indeed, falling trade costs raise the labor demand elasticity and thus reduce wage claims, so that governments are less incited to cut capital taxes in order to attract …rms. Secondly, when countries di¤er with respect to their labor market institutions, the capital tax is lower in the unionized country but the resulting location of capital is a priori ambiguous. We show that a majority of capital is invested in the unionized country, provided that the relative importance of wages over employment for the trade union is not too high. Interestingly, trade liberalization leads to a convergence in wages and taxes, making the unionized country more attractive. The latter result remains valid whatever the timing of events. We therefore bring a new insight to the locational e¤ects of asymmetric tax competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop the model. In section 3, we analyze the tax competition outcome in the benchmark case, where both labor markets are competitive. In sections 4 and 5 respectively, we consider the existence of a monopoly union in both countries and an asymmetric con…guration where the labor market is unionized in only one country. The robustness of the results is discussed in section 6. The last section concludes.
Model
The economy consists of two countries, labeled i = H; F . Variables associated with each country will be subscripted accordingly. Because we focus on the impact of labor market imperfections and trade liberalization upon tax policies, we control for any exogenous advantage by assuming countries with identical market sizes and the same technology.
We denote by l the mass of workers/consumers living in each country. Each individual works and consumes in the country she lives in. Moreover, each resident is endowed with k units of capital that she/he inelastically supplies. Thus, there are n 2lk units of capital in the economy and capital is internationally mobile. Finally, the government of each country is benevolent and maximizes the total welfare of its residents by levying a lump-sum tax on capital (t i ) on the source principle and a lump-sum tax on workers ( i ).
f of labor units and one unit of capital, so that n is also the number of …rms in the economy. Shipping the manufactured good is costly. Speci…cally, …rms incur a trade cost of > 0 units of the numéraire per unit of good shipped between the two countries. We assume that product markets are segmented and that labor markets are national. Each …rm determines a quantity speci…c to the country in which it sells its output and wages can di¤er from one country to another because workers are internationally immobile. Hence, quantities, prices, and wages are speci…c to each country but interdependent because of capital mobility.
The operating pro…ts of a …rm located in country i are given by
where x ii is the quantity that it supplies to domestic consumers, x ij is the quantity it sells to foreign consumers and p i is the price prevailing in country i. Thus, its net pro…ts are expressed as follows:
where r i is the rental rate of capital in country i. In the long run, r i is equalized across countries due to capital mobility.
Labor market regimes
We consider two types of wage setting regimes: a competitive labor market, and a trade union. The latter regime induces a higher wage than the competitive wage thereby generating unemployment.
A. Wage ‡exibility Under the competitive labor market regime, the equilibrium wage is simply determined by the labor market clearing condition which will be described in section 3.1.
B. Monopoly union
Three types of models with unionized labor markets are currently considered in the literature on trade unions: the monopoly union model, the wage bargaining model and e¢ cient bargaining models (see. Oswald, 1985) . Here, we choose the …rst alternative where the labor market is dominated by a monopoly union which chooses a wage for all …rms in the country subject to the labor demand function. The monopoly union can be seen as a special case because unions hold all the bargaining power. Nevertheless, our purpose being to highlight the way in which trade integration may a¤ect the relationships between labor market rigidities and capital taxation, it is reasonable in a …rst approach to assume two polar labor market regimes. 9 Moreover, the combination of linear Cournot oligopoly and monopoly unions is commonplace in the literature. 10 Union preferences are characterized by the following Stone-Geary-type utility function:
with w u i the nominal wage rate set by the union in country i, L d i the level of employment in country i, and w the reservation wage rate 11 . As emphasized by Cahuc and Zylberberg (1991) , the objective function above is a simple way of considering that unions are concerned by both wages and employment and it also avoids assigning an arbitrary value to the preference of unions. Hence, the parameter 2 (0; 1) represents the relative importance of wages over employment for the trade union. Moreover, this general speci…cation allows us to address the standard rent maximization hypothesis with = 0:5 (see. Naylor, 1998 Naylor, , 1999 Straume, 2003; Lommerud et al., 2003) .
Governments
Governments maximize the welfare of their residents by non-cooperatively choosing the per-unit tax on capital (t i ) and on employed workers ( i ). Following Persson and Tabellini (1992) in assuming that taxes exist only for the purpose of redistributing income, we disregard e¢ ciency considerations of public good provision. Given the one-to-one correspondence between …rms and capital, the budget constraint is given by:
where l e i is the number of workers in employment whereas l u i is the number of unemployed workers. Inserting (2), (3) in (1) and after rearrangements, we obtain the aggregate welfare in each country:
where S i denotes the consumer's surplus. The national welfare is the sum of six terms:
total consumers' surplus, capital income, labor income, disutility from labor, labor tax 9 The assumption that workers are shareholders would be problematic for the two other types of model.
In this case, both parties would negotiate for the same interest. 10 Examples are Bughin and Vannini (1995) , Lejour and Verbon (1996) , Leahy and Montagna (2000) , Lommerud et al. (2003) , Naylor (1998 Naylor ( , 1999 , Straume (2003) , Richter and Schneider (2001) , and LeiteMonteiro et al. (2003) . 11 It is assumed that unions have perfect information about the labor demand function.
income, bene…ts to unemployed residents and a constant equal to the total endowment of numéraire. Therefore, the maximization program of governments is tightly related to the labor market performance. When the labor market is competitive, l In the presence of trade unions and governments, three possible con…gurations should be considered: the union is a Stackelberg leader, the government is a Stackelberg leader, and both play Nash. The choice of the most representative sequence of events can be related to the duration of the policy set by each player. As Hersoug (1985) argued, union can be considered as a leader as wage contracts often have a longer duration than one year whereas changes in the tax policy would occur more frequently. There is however, no consensus on this point. Clearly, the game can also be related to the relative strength of the players and this brings us back to the degree of centralization of the wage setting (Boeters and Schneider, 1999 
Product and labor market outcomes (stage 3)
Given (1) and (2), the individual demand for the manufactured good in country i is given
In addition, maximizing (5) with respect to x ii and x ij yields the following quantity choices at the equilibrium: x ii = lp i and x ij = l (p j ). Thus, the supply to the domestic market depends exclusively upon the market size (constant in both countries) and upon the price at which goods are sold in each market. Additionally, the supply to the foreign market decreases with the level of trade barriers. Finally, the market-clearing condition of the manufacturing sector requires that (a p i ) l = n i x ii + n j x ji where n i is the mass of …rms or capital located in country i. Hereafter, we denote by a subscript variables at the short-run equilibrium. Solving the market-clearing condition gives the equilibrium price in country i:
The price in country i increases with trade barriers, because the local …rms are more protected against foreign competition, and with the mass of …rms located abroad because, in this case, the local competition is less intense. These prices lead to the following operating pro…ts:
We assume that the trade cost is non-prohibitive so that prices net of trade costs are positive whatever the spatial distribution of …rms:
We now turn to the labor market outcome. By inserting the budget constraint (2) in the resident's utility function (1) and maximizing the resulting expression with respect to l s i , we get the following equilibrium individual labor supply in country i:
so that the total supply of labor units is given by lw i = . Hence, our approach di¤ers from existing models of trade and location with tax competition where labor supply is inelastic.
In our framework, individual labor supply depends upon wages and the disutility from labor. The national demand for labor units, related to the requirement of labor and the number of …rms, is given by:
Thus, the labor market clearing condition yields the following wage rate equilibrium in country i:
where the subscript cc stands for the description of the outcome when labor markets are competitive in both countries. Clearly, the competitive wage prevailing in a country is a decreasing function of the number of workers and an increasing function of the number of …rms located in this country.
Location of capital (stage 2)
Due to free entry and exit, there are no pro…ts in equilibrium. The equilibrium rental rate in each country is thus determined by a bidding process for capital, which ends when no …rm can earn a strictly positive pro…t at the equilibrium market price:
The location of capital is governed by the spatial di¤erence in net returns to capital (15), evaluated at equilibrium prices (10) and wages (14). A spatial equilibrium 2 (0; 1) (with n H = n and n F = (1 ) n) is such that no unit of capital can induce a higher return by being invested in another country. Formally, an interior equilibrium arises at cc 2 (0; 1)
Solving this equality with respect to the share of capital invested in country H ( cc ) yields the location equilibrium for given taxes:
Some comments are in order. The location equilibrium is mainly the result of three mechanisms. The …rst is standard and known in the economic geography literature as a pro-competitive e¤ect. When a country hosts new …rms/capital, existing domestic …rms face more competitors in their domestic market and fewer in the foreign one. Thus, the domestic price falls whereas the foreign price rises (see 10). Domestic sales generate more revenues than foreign sales because of the trade cost (see 11), so that this e¤ect acts as a dispersion force. The pressure on the cost of labor induced by the agglomeration of …rms is the second force a¤ecting the international allocation of capital. Indeed, the attractiveness of the country with the …scal advantage is moderated for high …xed requirements in labor (f ) and high disutility from labor ( ). In this case, the …scal advantage is counteracted by a strong wage pressure which incites …rms to relocate. Finally, the location choice is a¤ected by the tax wedge. Unsurprisingly, a unilateral rise in capital taxation in a country leads to an out ‡ow of capital from this country (d cc =dt cc H < 0). The tax base elasticity in country H is given by:
and the tax base elasticity in country F can be derived by symmetry. Clearly, trade integration makes capital more responsive to a change in the tax wedge (d" cc i =d < 0). Observe from (10) that prices become less and less sensitive to the spatial distribution of …rms as trade costs decrease. Through this e¤ect, trade integration weakens the dispersion force associated with price competition and strengthens the weight of taxes in the capital location choice. Stated di¤erently, even small changes in the relative costs of doing business can induce important changes in capital location as the world economy is becoming more closely integrated.
It is also worth stressing that the tax base elasticity is weakened by high levels in labor input requirement and in disutility from labor, both raising the equilibrium wage.
More generally, when country i decreases its capital taxation, the resulting capital in ‡ow increases the wage cost by shifting labor demand upwards. In other words, the attractiveness e¤ect of a tax cut is limited by the upward adjustments of the wage rate.
Equilibrium tax policies (stage 1)
We now solve the …rst stage of the game and characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (the subscript~refers to variables evaluated at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium). When the labor market is competitive, l u i = 0 and l e i = l, so that the government's budget constraint amounts to:
Since budgets have to be balanced, the policy problem faced by each government is onedimensional: the choice of the capital tax rate determines the tax rate on workers required to satisfy the budget constraint.
Inserting the equilibrium level of labor supply (12), prices (10) and competitive wage
rates (14) in the welfare function (8), with the constraints that l u i = 0 and l e i = l, the objective function of each government amounts to:
where r represents the net return to capital at the location equilibrium while the fourth term represents the gross total wages of residents minus their disutility from labor. The consumer surplus S i , evaluated at equilibrium price in country i, is given by:
Before proceeding further with the analysis, we isolate how each component of the aggregate welfare reacts in response to a tax variation. Let us …rst consider the e¤ect of a variation of capital taxation on the domestic consumer's surplus. By introducing the location equilibrium in (19), we can easily show that in order to lower prices in its domestic market each government has an incentive to set a low tax burden on capital:
Secondly, the e¤ect of a marginal variation of t i on the net return to capital is given by:
This expression encapsulates one direct e¤ect and two indirect e¤ects. We …rst focus on the indirect e¤ects. By inducing more price competition among …rms, a tax cut reduces the operating pro…ts. In addition, when a unilateral tax cut is decided the labor demand shifts upwards and the cost of labor rises. Hence, an unilateral decrease in corporate tax gives rise to a lower gross-of-tax capital income. Nevertheless, as expected, a lower tax burden has a direct positive e¤ect on the net capital income.
Depending on the sign of t cc i , the third term in (18) describes the capital tax revenues or the …scal contribution of workers as taxation is assumed to be redistributive. Formally,
Again, the net e¤ect of a unilateral tax change is ambiguous. Starting from positive capital taxation, the tax base elasticity has to be low enough in order to allow a rise in the capital tax to increase capital tax revenues.
Finally, we can investigate the e¤ect of the tax policy upon the labor market component of the welfare equation, that is the gross labor incomes minus the disutility from labor. After substitutions and simpli…cations, we obtain
Clearly, reducing the tax burden on capital positively a¤ects the wage rate net of the disutility from labor. The mechanism at work is simple: a tax cut generates an in ‡ow of capital that increases the level of the competitive wage.
Maximizing (18) with respect to t cc i , we get the equilibrium tax on capital in each country
Trivial calculations revealt cc > 0 as long as > with
Below a threshold level of trade costs ( ), governments subsidize capital and tax the labor income. Furthermore, capital taxes describe a J-shaped curve with respect to since dt cc =d T 0 when R =2. Starting from high trade costs ( ), a gradual fall in trade barriers reduces capital taxes. When trade liberalization reaches intermediate levels ( > > =2), governments subsidize capital. Hence, the subsidy level rises as trade costs decline further. Nevertheless, when trade costs reach =2, the cost for workers to …nance higher subsidies for …rms exceeds the bene…ts they enjoy from this policy.
Consequently, the subsidy level for capital shrinks andt cc tends to zero when trade liberalization approaches free trade. Put di¤erently, tax competition is relaxed when trade costs reach low values 13 .
Given the perfect symmetry of the model, the location equilibrium is symmetric (that is,~ cc = 1=2). Inserting it into the competitive wage (14), we get the level of wagesw cc in each country at the location equilibrium:
4 Tax competition with a unionized labor market in both countries
We now extend our basic model to the case where the wage setting is centralized and a monopoly union operates as Stackelberg leader in each country. Therefore, our model is now a fourth-stage game. The product market outcome arising at the fourth stage of the game is given by expressions (11) and (10) 
From this expression, we can deduce the tax base elasticity for capital invested in country
13 Interestingly, we thereby show that the J-shaped relationship between capital taxes and trade costs, which was …rst demonstrated in the tax competition literature based on NEG models with a constant wage (Ludema and Wooton, 2000; Kind et al., 2000; Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005; Hau ‡er and Wooton, 2010) , also holds when wages increase with the number of domestic …rms. and a symmetrical expression holds for the tax base elasticity in country F . As in the benchmark case with competitive labor markets, a unilateral increase in the capital tax yields a capital out ‡ow. However, we have " Because of distortions on the labor market, each government is now faced with two categories of households depending upon their position in the labor market (employed or unemployed). Labor tax is levied exclusively on employed residents and each national government provides bene…ts b to unemployed residents. As a result, the government's budget constraint in country i amounts to:
where
. This leads to intuitive relationships: unemployment increases with the wage set by the unions while it decreases with the number of …rms, the …xed requirement of labor and the preference for leisure. With (24) and after rearrangements, the objective function of each government is given as:
where uu i is given by equation (22) for i = H. At this stage, the wage rate is exogenous and governments cannot in ‡uence the wage claims of the domestic union by manipulating taxes accordingly in order to a¤ect the location of capital. Nevertheless, the tax policy will have a direct e¤ect on the spatial distribution of capital and then on the number of workers employed l e i . By maximizing (25) with respect to t i for each government, we get the following Nash tax equilibrium:
with j 6 = i. Several comments are in order. First, for given wages, the tax rate in each country reacts to a change in trade costs in exactly the same way as when both labor 14 Intuitively, this analysis is also valid in the case of an exogenous wage in each country and more generally for all wage rigidities such that agglomeration has no impact upon the cost of labor.
markets > 0). Thus, the intensity of tax competition is closely related with the labor market outcome and this preliminary result illustrates the possibility of using taxation to compensate …rms for high labor costs.
Equilibrium wage rates (stage 1)
Having described the optimal choice of tax rates by governments, we can solve the maximization program of monopoly unions to de…ne the equilibrium wage rate in each country.
Each labor union sets w First, high wages have a standard negative e¤ect in terms of attractiveness, which causes a decrease in the labor demand. Secondly, monopoly unions anticipate that high wages lead the government to set low taxes on capital (see 26). Thus, the negative impact upon the attractiveness of high wage claims is moderated by the tax adjustment. Formally, the labor demand elasticity with respect to the wage rate in country i is expressed as follows:
with i > 0 at the symmetric equilibrium. We can observe that i decreases with . In other words, trade integration increases the labor demand elasticity. Interestingly, this result illustrates Rodrik's intuition that "trade increases the degree to which employers can react to changes in prevailing wages by outsourcing or investing abroad" (Rodrik, 1997, p. 12-13) . Now, we can describe the trade-o¤ for monopoly unions. While choosing high wages increases the workers' gross income, it reduces labor demand and leads more people to become unemployed. The total e¤ect of a wage increase on the wage bill depends upon the relative strength of each e¤ect. Inserting the labor demand function into the monopoly union's objective function and maximizing the corresponding expression with respect to w uu i , we get the following reaction function for the trade union in country i:
Consequently, the equilibrium wage rates are given by:
Interestingly, the wage rate declines with trade integration (dw uu =d > 0 and d 2wuu =d 2 > 0). By increasing the labor demand elasticity to the wage rate, trade integration forces trade unions to lower the wage rates in order to reduce the negative e¤ect of a high wage on labor demand and the resulting level of employment. This result is the opposite of that which was found by Naylor (1998), according to which wages increase with trade integration when the spatial distribution of …rms is exogenous. Thus, ignoring the fact that high wages might deter investments, Naylor's model cannot capture the e¤ect of trade costs on the aggregate labor demand elasticity. The only channel through which trade costs a¤ect labor demand comes from the positive impact of a decline in trade costs upon the total output and employment of each …rm. Within our framework, we do not capture this e¤ect because we consider that the marginal labor requirement equals to zero.
This allows us to isolate and determine how the relationship between trade integration and wages can be a¤ected by capital mobility and its impact upon the demand for labor.
In this way, trade integration increases the tax base elasticity and, in …ne, raises the labor demand elasticity, in accordance with empirical studies. Indeed, from US data, Slaughter (2001) shows that the demand for production labor has become more elastic in manufacturing: the elasticity reached -0.5 by the mid-1970s and around -1.0 in 1991. Under capital tax competition, the equilibrium wage rate set by unions decreases with trade integration.
15 At these levels of equilibrium wages, the second-order condition is checked.
Having determined the equilibrium level of wages in each country, we can evaluate the capital taxes at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). By introducing (28) Clearly, a more aggressive tax policy takes place to compensate …rms for wage rigidity. As expected, the higher the importance attached to the wage in the union's objective function, the lower the level of capital tax (dt uu =d < 0). Moreover, the existence of a trade union implies that the con…guration where workers become the net-contributors of the public sector emerges earlier in the process of trade integration.
Proposition 2 Assume monopoly unions in each country both playing as Stackelberg leaders. A shift from a ‡exible labor market to a unionized labor market strengthens capital tax competition, regardless of trade costs.
How do capital taxes at the SPNE react to trade integration? Some calculations reveal that the equilibrium level of the capital tax rate increases with trade integration provided that the relative importance of wages over employment for the trade union is high enough.
Indeed, we have: dt
Hence, when < =2, botht cc andt uu increase with trade integration. However, when > =2, a fall in trade costs decreasest cc but raisest uu if and only if is above a threshold level with = a (2n + 3) a (10n + 13) The latter relationship arises for the following reason. The third term in (??) captures the negative e¤ect of the wage set by unions on corporate tax, and this e¤ect is magni…ed by high levels of . Thus, provided that is high enough, the erosion of this negative wage e¤ect on taxation due to trade integration counterbalances the opposite direct e¤ect ont cc . Hence, contrary to the con…guration with a competitive wage, trade integration always relaxes tax competition when is high enough. This scenario occurs, for example, under the rent maximization hypothesis. By contrast, when the importance attached to the employment in the union's objective function is relatively high, wages tend to be closer to the reference wage rate (w) so that the magnitude of the changes in wages is lower and trade integration intensi…es tax competition. The subgame perfect Nash tax equilibrium is thus less dependent upon the labor market outcome and increases with trade costs.
To summarize:
Proposition 3 Assume monopoly unions in each country both playing as Stackelberg leaders. When trade costs are above =2, trade openness relaxes (resp. strengthens) capital tax competition, provided that the relative importance of wages over employment for unions is high (resp. low) enough. Once trade costs decline below =2, trade integration relaxes capital tax competition regardless of the relative importance of wages over employment for unions.
To complete our analysis, we brie ‡y investigate the level of unemployment and labor tax at the SPNE. Assume that the reservation wage is equal to the competitive wage given by (21). The number of unemployed people in each country is given by:
It is worth noting that as trade integration results in a lower wage set by the union, it also reduces unemployment in the economy (dl u i =d > 0). Considering the impact of a trade cost reduction upon the level of the labor tax is a more complex task. From the budget constraint (24), the labor tax in country i is given by:
Clearly, trade liberalization may have an ambiguous e¤ect on labor tax at the SPNE.
By expanding the tax base (l 
Asymmetric labor market regimes
Countries can be very di¤erent with respect to their labor market institutions, and this could partly explain the variations in labor market performance across di¤erent countries (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000) . In this section, we keep the assumption that monopoly unions are Stackelberg leaders but we analyze tax competition between countries that di¤er with respect to their labor market institutions. More precisely, we investigate the tax competition outcome between a country with a competitive labor market and a country in which the wage rate is set by a monopoly union.
Capital location and tax base elasticities (stage 3)
We assume that the national wage in country F is …xed by a monopoly union while there are no labor market imperfections in the other country. The spatial equilibrium cu is
, and given by:
It is not surprising that, for given and equal taxes, country H will host more capital/…rms than in the symmetrical con…guration ( cu > cc ) as long as the wage rate chosen by the monopoly union in country F is higher than the competitive wage resulting from the competitive labor market (w cu F >w cc ).
The tax base elasticities in country H and F are expressed as follows:
For each country, we compare the tax base elasticity in the asymmetric con…guration with the tax base elasticity that would result if both countries adopted a free labor market institution. Some standard calculations show:
The tax base elasticity of the unionized country is always higher than if there were no labor market imperfections, as is the case for its trading partner. Indeed, following a marginal tax increase in the unionized country, the wage does not shift downward due to the capital out ‡ow, contrary to what happens with a ‡exible wage setting. Consequently, the capital location is more responsive to a change in tax rate.
It is also worth stressing that tax base elasticity in country H closely depends upon the wage claims in country F . When the wage set by the monopoly union is high enough (w cu F > 2w cc ), capital invested in country H has less incentive to relocate in country F following a rise in t H . Hence, by keeping its labor market regime unchanged, country H can bene…t from a lower tax base elasticity when country F is the single country to move from a free labor market to an unionized labor market.
Nash tax equilibrium (stage 2)
We now describe the Nash tax equilibrium. As the labor market legislation di¤ers between countries, each national government has a di¤erent objective function and a di¤erent budget constraint. The objective function of country H is given by (18), whereas the objective function of the government of country F , which has to deal with unemployment, is given by (25). Moreover, the location equilibrium is now given by (31).
Solving the …rst-order condition for each government, we get the following Nash tax equilibrium:
with
It appears that t cu F < t cc as long as w cu F >w cc . In other words, a shift from a ‡exible labor market to a unionized labor market in a single country (here country F ) lowers the capital tax rate in this country. This result arises from the higher tax base elasticity in the latter labor market regime (see (32)) and the need to compensate …rms for a labor cost above its competitive level. By contrast, t cu H > t cc if and only if w cu F > 2w cc . Thus, tax pressure on capital rises in the country which maintains a ‡exible labor market, provided that its trading partner's union wage is high enough. Indeed, in this case, country H bene…ts from both a lower tax base elasticity (see (33)) and a high labor cost in country F , allowing its government to set higher tax pressure on capital.
It is easy to check that t cu H t cu F > 0 as long as w cu F >w cc so that the existence of trade unions within a country enables its trading partner to set a higher capital tax rate.
Moreover, an increasing wage set by the union in country F induces a higher tax wedge.
Indeed, the labor cost disadvantage being stronger in country F , its government has to decide on a tax cut to maintain capital while country H can increase the tax burden on capital. In addition, for a given wage in country F (w Finally, we know that an increase in w cu F negatively (resp. positively) a¤ects the capital tax rate in country F (resp. in country H). Hence, if an increase in w cu F favors the location of capital in country H, that also magni…es the tax wedge and thus indirectly favors the location of capital in country F . Thus, the e¤ect of the wage set by the monopoly union on the international allocation of capital is ambiguous. At Nash equilibrium tax rates, we obtain the following location equilibrium:
revealing that an increase in w cu F favors the location of capital in the country where there are no wage rigidities. In addition, it is worth emphasizing that cu > 1=2 if and only if
Hence, the country where there are labor market rigidities can accommodate the majority of capital provided that the wage set by the union is not too high.
Equilibrium wage rate (stage 1)
We now solve the …rst stage of the game. By inserting (35) into the labor demand schedule and by maximizing the union's objective function with respect to w cu F , we get the following equilibrium wage rate in the unionized country:
which is increasing with trade costs (dw cu F =d > 0). By introducing (36) in (34), it appears that the impact of trade costs on the capital tax rates is ambiguous. Indeed, we have
Hereafter, we make the standard assumption that the reservation wage is just equal to the competitive wage arising from competitive labor markets in both countries ( w =w cc ).
We should recall that the …rst term in (37-a) and (37-b) is not a¤ected by wage rigidities in country F and describes a non-monotonous relationship between the level of taxation and trade costs (see Section 3.3). The second term de…nes an additional e¤ect of trade integration passing through the labor market in country F . Thus, it is easy to check that F rises when becomes lower. This e¤ect reveals the negative impact of trade integration upon the wage claim of the union in country F which allows its government to make upwards adjustements of capital taxation. Finally, we verify that the total e¤ect of trade openness on the capital tax rate in the unionized country is positive provided that trade costs are low enough ( < =2) or, otherwise, when the union su¢ ciently values wages over employment. For instance, assuming a rent maximization behavior ( = 1=2), the capital tax rate prevailing in country F always increases with trade integration.
The e¤ect of trade integration upon tax burden on capital located in the non-unionized country di¤ers. Indeed, as trade integration gives rise to a fall in the cost of labor in the unionized country, the government of country H has an incentive to make a downwards adjustment of its taxation. For instance, assuming a rent maximization behavior ( = 1=2), H is continuously decreasing with trade liberalization. In this case, provided that > =2, capital taxation always adjusts downward with reduced trade costs as both t cc and H diminish with lower levels of . For < =2, trade liberalization generates two e¤ects which act in opposite directions and the net e¤ect becomes ambiguous. Nevertheless, for the most general case ( 2 (0; 1)), trivial calculations reveal that dt cu H =d > 0 is more likely to occur when decreasing trade costs lead to an important erosion of the wage set by the monopoly union in country F , that is when and take initially high values. In this case, a downwards adjustment of capital taxation in country H is the best response to a more and more ompetitive labor cost in country F even if the latter country may simultaneously make an upwards adjustment of its taxation.
16
The impact of trade costs upon the tax wedge can be described as follows d(t 
We check that^ is strictly decreasing with and equals 1=(65 + 48n) when trade integration is perfect ( = 0). Consequently, for a very large range of values and, for example, when = 1=2, trade integration induces a fall in the international corporate tax wedge.
This result is consistent with the analysis above where we show that a decrease in trade costs is more likely to lead to a higher level of capital taxation in country F and a lower level in country H.
We now turn to the location of …rms at the SPNE. One key question we have to 16 To understand this result, we should observe that d address is whether or not country F can be a net-importer of capital or host a majority of …rms despite the rigidities on its labor market. By inserting the equilibrium level of Clearly, the country with labor market rigidities may host a majority of …rms (~ cu < 1=2).
Such a scenario occurs when the relative importance of wages over employment for the trade union and the resulting wage equilibrium are not too high (low ). ). It is excluded, for instance, when we assume the rent maximization hypothesis. In which case, country F is a net-exporter of capital because the level of capital taxation in this country is always insu¢ cient to compensate …rms for high labor costs and to render this country more attractive. Interestingly, it gives us a new insight into the locational e¤ects of tax competition. Indeed, a standard result in the tax competition literature with perfect competition and countries with asymmetric sizes is that the country with the lowest capital taxation (the small country) will always be a net-importer of capital (see Wildasin, 2004 , Bucovesky, 1991) . This result is commonly challenged in the New
Economic Geography models where, thanks to the existence of an agglomeration rent, the large country is not only the country with the lowest capital taxation but also a netimporter of capital. Here, we show that, by considering an asymmetry not as exogenous (market sizes) but rather as endogenously determined by the behavior of a monopoly union acting as Stackelberg leader, both scenarios can occur.
Finally, we observe that the mass of capital within the country with a free labor market decreases with trade integration (d~ cu =d > 0). This result comes from the di¤erent impact of trade integration upon wages in each country. Indeed, the competitive wage in country H decreases with trade integration but less strongly than the wage in the unionized country so that trade integration induces a wage convergence (d(w cu F w cu H )=d > 0). Hence, on the one hand trade integration reduces the '…scal'incentive to locate in the unionized country whilst, on the other hand, the 'labor cost'is an incentive to locate in the country with a competitive labor market. As the mass of capital invested in country H decreases with trade integration, we can conclude that the second e¤ect is dominant.
Proposition 4 Assume a monopoly union in one country whereas the labor market of the other country is competitive. Due to capital tax competition, the unionized country sets a lower capital tax and attracts a higher share of capital provided that the relative importance of wages over employment for the monopoly union is not too high. The mass of capital invested in this country increases with trade integration.
Discussion
Until now, we considered the trade unions to be acting as Stackelberg leaders. In the appendix, we present the results with two alternative timings of events: when governments act as Stackelberg leaders (as in Palokangas, 1989, Fuest and Huber, 1999) Another question we can raise is whether or not results would hold under another kind of wage rigidity. Following Ogawa et al. (2006) , we also parametrized labor market rigidities in a simple and extreme way, by considering that the wage rate in each country is set exogenously at a level ! higher than the competitive wage. This wage rigidity being exogenous and thus independent of trade integration, we cannot discuss proposition 1 anymore and intuitively, capital taxes follow a J-shaped relationship with trade integration, as when labor markets are competitive. Nevertheless, proposition 2 and 4 remain valid. A shift from a ‡exible labor market to a labor market with a rigid wage reduces business tax rates, because of the higher tax base elasticity and the higher cost of labor.
Finally, when there is an exogenous wage rigidity in only one country, we still observe that its government sets a lower capital tax and, by so doing, is able to successfully attract a majority of capital provided that the national wage is not too high. In such a case, we also observe that trade integration improves the attractiveness of the country su¤ering from unemployment. Thus, proposition 4 still prevails.
Conclusion
Unemployment might be one of the major reasons behind why governments try to attract …rms through their tax policy. In this paper, we have explored the relationship between labor market imperfections and tax competition in a framework with imperfect competition and trade costs. Our results can be summarized as follows. Firstly, we show that labor market imperfections in both countries strengthen tax competition as compared with the case where both labor markets are competitive. Secondly, the impact of trade integration on tax policies depends on the con…guration of the labor market. When the labor market is competitive, capital taxes follow a J-shaped relationship with trade costs.
By contrast, when labor markets are unionized and preferences of union for wage over employment are high enough, capital taxes may increase with trade integration whatever the level of trade costs. This result is valid when trade unions act as Stackelberg leaders and when trade unions and governments act simultaneously. We also analyze the tax competition outcome in the asymmetric case where the labor market is competitive in one country and unionized in the other one. We show that the capital tax rate is lower in the unionized country and that a majority of capital can locate there under certain circumstances.
Of course, this model is stylized and ignores important aspects of the wage formation process. It would be interesting to model wage bargaining in a more general case where both unions and …rms have bargaining power. Moreover, a welfare analysis is needed in order to know whether tax competition is welfare-enhancing or not when faced with labor market imperfections. This welfare analysis is left for further work.
Finally, although our paper is motivated by empirical facts reported in the introduction, an econometric analysis is needed to support our main …ndings. More precisely, by following the literature on tax interactions (Devereux et al., 2008) , a tax reaction function could be estimated. It would consist of regressing corporate taxes on indicators of trade openness, on labor market rigidities and on the interaction of these two variables.
the location of capital. In the second stage, each monopoly union chooses its wage level, taking governments'tax policies as given, and anticipating the impact of their choice on the location of capital. The following stages of the game remain unchanged.
Symmetric tax competition. The product market outcome at the fourth stage of the game is described in section 3.1.1. whereas the location equilibrium for given taxes and wages is given by (26). We now solve the second stage of the game where monopoly unions set their level of wages, taking tax choices of governments as given and anticipating the resulting private sector outcome. The monopoly union in country i determines w 
As expected, the level of wage chosen by a monopoly union in a country decreases with the capital tax rate in this country and increases with the capital tax rate in the other country.
We can now solve the maximization program of each government: Because each government anticipates the impact of its tax policy upon the labor market outcome, there is an additional incentive to decrease the capital tax in order to increase the equilibrium wage rate and to reduce the unemployment rate through a capital in ‡ow.
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On the other hand, each government also has an additional incentive to increase capital taxation in order to reduce the unemployment rate through the wage decrease set by the 17 By evaluating the spatial equilibrium at the level of wages set by monopoly unions, we check that a unilateral increase in capital taxation induces a capital out ‡ow even if it lowers the national wage rate.
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union. The tax reaction function of each country is given by 
Again, capital taxes are lower than when labor markets are competitive so that proposition 2 remains valid. Moreover, they are higher than when monopoly unions act as Stackelberg leaders (see ??) 18 .
Finally, inserting these equilibrium taxes (39) in (38), we get the equilibrium wage rate in each country at the SPNE:
Again,w uu i decreases with trade integration and Proposition 1 still holds. Moreover, since governments set higher taxes when they act as Stackelberg leaders, the equilibrium wage set by monopoly unions at the following stage is lower than its level when they take their decision before governments.
Asymmetric tax competition. We now present the result for the asymmetric con…guration where the labor market is competitive in country H while it is unionized in country F . The product market outcome at the fourth stage of the game is described in Section 3.1.1. We …rst solve the second stage of the game where the monopoly union in country F chooses the level of the national wage, taking tax choices of governments as given and anticipating the resulting private sector outcome.
The monopoly union in country F sets w 
18 The intuition for this result comes from the lower tax base elasticity when governments act as Stackelberg leaders. Indeed, the tax base erosion e¤ect is limited by the fact that an increase in capital taxation is partly compensated by the decrease in the wage rate set by monopoly unions. By contrast, when governments set their tax policy after trade unions have decided the level of wages, this wage adjustment does not exist so that an increase in capital taxation induces a more important capital out ‡ow.
Assuming that the reservation wage is equal tow cc and solving the maximization program of governments, we reach the following equilibrium tax gap: As in the benchmark case, the competitive wage is lower than the level of wage set by monopoly union in country F . Moreover, it is lower than when the monopoly union in country F acts as a Stackelberg leader.
